This paper provides evidence on market surveillance from stock exchanges and securities commissions from 25 jurisdictions in North, Central and South America, Western and Eastern Europe, Africa and Asia. Stock exchanges as SROs engage in a greater range of single-market surveillance than securities commissions, but the scope of cross-market surveillance activity is very similar among stock exchanges and securities commissions. Cross-market surveillance is more effective with information sharing arrangements, and securities commissions are more likely to engage in information sharing than stock exchanges. The scope of cross-market surveillance is highly positively correlated with trading activity, unlike the scope of single-market surveillance. The data also indicate that as at 2005, there is ample scope for jurisdictions to expand their cross-market surveillance and thereby stimulate investor confidence and trading activity.
Introduction
In this paper, we examine the market surveillance activities from exchanges and securities commissions 1 from 25 jurisdictions in North, Central and South America, Western and Eastern Europe, Africa and Asia. We study both single-and cross-market surveillance, 2 and relate surveillance activities to trading, listings and market capitalization for a sample of emerging and developed stock markets.
Market surveillance is carried out by exchanges and securities commissions to detect possible market manipulation by market participants. Market manipulation refers to a wide range of trading practices that distort prices and enable market manipulators to profit at the expense of other participants. The manipulative practices are varied in nature, although there are more "commonplace" practices that are easily identifiable. For example, "insider trading", the trading of securities based on information unavailable to the general public, is an example of a manipulative practice that is easily identifiable by the public. Other less well publicized manipulative practices include "spoofing" or "painting the tape" refers to a trader engaging in a series of transactions reported on a public display facility to give the impression of activity or price movement in a security (e.g. misleading trading, switches, giving up priority, layering bid/asks, fictitious orders for the case of spoofing, etc.). "Pumping and dumping" or "ramping" refers to a trader buying at increasingly higher prices, whereby securities are sold in the market (often to retail customers) at the higher prices. "Trade through" refers to the completion of a client's order at a price inferior to the best quoted bid or ask. There are many other examples of manipulative behaviour including but not limited to "advancing the bid", "front running", "churning", "capping/pegging", etc., each defined herein. Ideally, surveillance authorities have sophisticated mechanisms to detect such manipulative trading within their own market, as well as across markets, and jurisdictions.
While the terms insider trading and market manipulation are commonplace in the literature, the formal discipline in which these concepts take centre stage, namely market surveillance, has traditionally been shrouded in secrecy. The oft cited reason for this is to refrain 1 For the purposes of this paper reference to exchanges include stock, bonds, commodities and derivatives markets. Reference to securities commissions also include regulators of the same markets.
2
Unless otherwise indicated, "cross-market" refers to cross-product, cross-market (e.g., two exchanges in one jurisdiction) as well as cross-border (more than one jurisdiction).
from giving would be insider traders and/or market manipulator any idea that might allow them to avoid detection. But arguably investors should be in a position to compare and contrast the capabilities of different surveillance authorities as part of making a considered judgment about the risk of investing in particular markets. In the absence of information to the contrary it has mostly been assumed that there is likely to be a high correlation between market efficiency and market integrity. Putting this another way, if one security is more liquid than another, then the ability to manipulate the price of that security will, all other things being equal, be less. Of course not all other things are equal and the ability to manipulate a security is also a function of the ability of investors to take large positions in a security. While market manipulation is more difficult in securities that are highly liquid, the propensity of particular exchanges to list very small companies in the interest of raising listing fees, etc., plays into the hands of would be manipulators (see, e.g., Harris, 2003) . Because manipulative activities are likely to have adverse consequences in terms of attracting new investors to, and retaining existing investors in, a marketplace, both exchanges and securities commissions have developed appropriate regulations and at the same time invested in security market surveillance activities to identify and prosecute such activity. Understanding the effectiveness of security market surveillance departments should help investors to gain confidence in a marketplace and therefore it seems sensible to compare and contrast such divisions. This paper represents a first attempt to do so.
The specific issues addressed in our empirical analyses are as follows. The new surveillance data introduced in this paper indicate a number of new insights about sources of international difference in market integrity. First, jurisdictions with exchanges which are self-regulatory organizations ("SROs") 4 are more intensive in regards to single-market 3 This literature is briefly reviewed in section 2 of this paper.
4
A self regulatory organization (SRO) is an exchange or regulator that has been given the responsibility and surveillance than securities commissions. This is intuitive, as exchanges have a self-interested role in maintaining the integrity of their own market in order to attract new listings and increase trading activity. However, jurisdictions with exchanges as SROs do not play a greater role in cross-market surveillance than jurisdictions in which securities commissions play a significant role in market surveillance.
Second, cross-market surveillance is much more effective when different jurisdictions have information sharing arrangements, and when such information sharing is broader in scope.
Interestingly, securities commissions are more likely to engage in information sharing than exchanges. This is perhaps intuitive as securities commissions are less likely to view themselves as competitors among regulatory bodies than exchanges which are more commercial in nature.
Third, there is scant evidence in the data herein that single-market surveillance is related to trading volume when the 25 jurisdictions are compared. However, there is significant evidence that cross-market surveillance is highly positively correlated with trading activity. In this paper we provide simultaneous equation analyses that control for the endogeneity of surveillance activities vis-à-vis trading activity. The data continue to show a strong positive relation between cross-market surveillance and trading activity even in a multivariate context with numerous control variables and with specifications for endogeneity. The evidence is consistent with the view that cross-market surveillance facilitates trading activity. 
A Brief Review of Market Manipulation and Surveillance
Surveillance systems within exchanges around the world are automated. Real time surveillance systems generate alerts based on orders and executed trades. Alerts should be based on not merely single trades but rather patterns of trading to detect potential manipulative practices. Computer software, such as that provided by SMARTS, Inc., 6 manages the alerts provided to surveillance staff for many exchanges and securities commissions around the world.
The set of alerts in conjunction with manipulative practices depicted in Table 1 is comprehensive for most surveillance systems, and these alerts apply to both single-market manipulations as well as cross-market manipulations. The central focus of the empirical analyses herein is first in documenting the extent to which scope of manipulations in Table 1 are suspected/detected, and second the scope of single-and cross-market surveillance in relation to trading liquidity and other measure of market quality in different exchanges around the world.
[ Table 1 About Here]
Single market surveillance systems can be directly implemented at comparatively low costs relative to the market capitalization of most any given exchange around the world. Crossmarket surveillance (including cross-product, cross-market within a country and cross-border), by contrast, involves much greater technical sophistication that is not easily replicated by an exchange for the following reasons. The level of sophistication of financial trading patterns across different products (such as derivatives and securities) is much more complicated (and our data below suggest many surveillance authorities in different countries do not appear to be aware of the ways in which traders can carry out manipulative cross-market trades). Computer software to detect cross-market manipulations to pick op patterns of trading across markets needs significantly greater sophistication than the simple single market trading alerts. Surveillance staff members need to coordinate surveillance across different markets monitored, which requires proper organizational alignment. As well, for cross-market and cross-border surveillance there needs to be information sharing arrangements and coordination of surveillance for cross-market and cross-border surveillance to be effective. Such coordination is further complicated by the protectionist policies arising from the commercial self interest of the respective markets and the related cross jurisdictional legality issues.
In addition to examining the scope of single-and cross-market surveillance, we also assess in this paper the effectiveness of the surveillance systems in different jurisdictions around the world. Effectiveness depends on a number of factors. First, alerts should minimize false positive and maximize true positive manipulative practices. To be able to do this, the surveillance system needs to ascertain normal trading activity to set alert parameters. For example, normal price and volume measures need to be set for typical trading ranges for a particular product traded on the exchange. Second, a surveillance department should be able the reconstruct all trading activity to replay the full order/quote schedule. It is also important for market surveillance to identify the activity of each market participant. Third, the surveillance staff needs to be versed on the issues that need to be investigated. The quality of a surveillance system depends on the quality of the software used and the degree to which the surveillance staff are educated and trained with regard to using the information provided in the alerts. Fourth, the effectiveness of a surveillance system also depends on the degree to which market participants are informed about the surveillance activities. Fifth, for cross-market surveillance, surveillance effectiveness depends to a significant degree on the extent to which information is shared across jurisdictions. Sixth, the efficiency of the surveillance system depends on the regulatory framework. In many jurisdictions around the world, the exchanges themselves are SROs whereby they establish their own listing standards, monitor and discipline market participants for violation of their rules of operation. In other jurisdictions, the securities commission has a greater role in setting listing standards and trading rules. Recent empirical evidence is consistent with the view that private enforcement benefits markets while public enforcement does little to benefit markets (La Porta et al., 2006) .
The central conjecture that is tested in this paper is that the scope of single-market surveillance is unrelated to trading volume, while the scope of cross-market surveillance is significantly positively correlated with trading volume. Because single-market surveillance can be easily replicated on any exchange and at comparatively low cost, single-market surveillance does not distinguish an exchange and inspire confidence among traders relative to that of competitor exchanges. By contrast, cross-market surveillance is sufficiently complex and costly that it cannot be replicated by lower quality exchanges. Cross-market surveillance will be carried out in higher quality exchanges and inspire confidence among traders and facilitate trading volume. We expect a bi-directional causality between the scope of cross-market surveillance and trading volume, as larger exchanges will have larger budgets for surveillance, and surveillance inspires market confidence and thereby attracts traders and facilitates trading.
Our central hypotheses are related to a number of papers on the law and economics of securities regulation, market surveillance, market efficiency and market integrity. There is evidence from a few country-and market-specific studies that manipulative trading impedes market integrity, as well as theoretical work on topic. For instance, Hillion and Suominen (2004) study manipulation around closing times. Merrick et al. (2005) study the effect of trading activities in one market in relation to price changes in another market, thereby enabling manipulators to profit from what is known as a "squeeze". Pirrong (1993, 1995, 2004) studies the relationship between commodity and financial markets and the ability of market manipulators to profit from cross-market manipulation. Easterbrook (1986) and Kumar and Seppi (1992) provide similar analyses of manipulation of futures markets. As well, Ni et al. (2005) provide evidence of manipulative trading as between stock prices and derivative prices in that stock prices tend to converge on the strike price of the associated derivative at the time of expiration of the derivative (see also Jarrow, 1992 Jarrow, , 1994 , for evidence of manipulation of derivatives markets). Aggarwal and Guojun, (2003) provide evidence from the United States ("US') that market manipulation impedes market efficiency (see also Gale, 1992, and Gorton, 1992 , for related theoretical work). Comerton-Forde and Rydge (2006) show surveillance efforts improve market integrity in Australia. Aitken and Siow (2003) provide international evidence of market efficiency in terms of transaction costs and market integrity based on the likelihood of a security being subject to ramping in the last 15 minutes of trading; they find a strong positive correspondence between efficiency and integrity. 7 La Porta et al. (2006) and Daouk et al. (2005) provide evidence that market integrity around the world depends critically on securities regulation. 8 Overall, therefore, we may infer that market integrity depends not only on market regulation but also on the quality of market surveillance that limits the extent of market manipulation. Prior work, however, has not directly examined the role of single-and crossmarket surveillance in facilitating market integrity in an international setting. Our paper fills this gap in the literature.
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See also Gerard and Nanda (1992), Felixson and Pelli (1999) , Mahoney (1999) and Vitale (2000) .
8
For related work, see La Porta et al. (1997 Porta et al. ( , 1998 Porta et al. ( , 1999a Porta et al. ( ,b, 2002 .
Our empirical analyses in the next sections are based on a new dataset which measures the scope of single and cross-market surveillance. The data match a number of exchange characteristics and outcomes with the scope of surveillance activities, among other things. The data are introduced in the next section.
Data and Summary Statistics
The data in this paper are derived from questionnaires sent to 75 jurisdictions around the world. 9 The questionnaires were first vetted with Regulation Services, Inc. and dumping and marking the close for exchanges (all defined in Table 1 ). Cross-market surveillance is more intensive for capping/pegging, insider trading and dissemination of false and misleading information.
[ Figure 2 About Here]
The scope of cross-market surveillance in Figure 2 is indicated as a percentage of the jurisdictions with foreign companies listed on the local exchange (13 jurisdictions in total), and 9 A copy of the survey is available upon request from the authors.
not as a percentage of the total number of jurisdictions (25) . Note that all jurisdictions in the sample comprised exchanges that traded a multitude of products, and hence cross-market surveillance is relevant for all exchanges. However, cross-border surveillance is less applicable to some of the exchanges. Hence, Figure 2 presents the extent of cross-market surveillance in a way that provides a favorable view (that is, favorable to the surveillance authorities) as to the degree of importance of the issue of cross-market surveillance in relation to what is actually monitored, in comparison to the extent of single-market surveillance. The data clearly indicate that there is a dearth of cross-market surveillance relative to the need for cross-market surveillance, even when the scope of cross-market surveillance is perhaps overstated relative to its need as in Figure 2 . is uncorrelated with trading activity (the correlation is 0.13; see Table 4 below). 10 However, the data quite clearly depict a positive relation between the scope of cross-market surveillance and trading activity (the correlation is 0.77; see Table 4 below). One interpretation of the data is that larger jurisdictions with richer countries are more inclined to invest in cross-market surveillance, and also have more intensive trading activity. A second interpretation is that cross-market surveillance facilitates increased confidence in the market and thereby enhances trading activity.
This dual causality hypothesis is considered in the multivariate empirical analyses provided below in the next section.
[ Figure 3 About Here]
Summary statistics are provided in Tables 2-4 . Table 2 provides definitions of the different variables considered, categorized by surveillance, exchange and jurisdiction variables. Table 3 indicates the average exchange in the data has surveillance on 14-15 different types of single-market manipulation, but only 2-3 different types of cross-market manipulations.
[ Tables 2-4 About Here] 10 Note, however, that this does not refer to the quality of single-market surveillance. We may expect that exchanges with higher quality surveillance (in terms of technology and people, for example) are better able to facilitate market confidence and thereby enhance trading activity, etc. See, e.g., Aitken and Siow (2003) . Below, in this paper we also provide some evidence about the quality of surveillance. Table 3 Panels A and B provides data on the extent to which exchanges versus commissions are involved in surveillance. The data are provided on a ranking scale from 1-5, where 1 indicates the securities commission is primarily responsible and 5 indicates the exchange is primarily responsible. For the average jurisdiction, the responsibility is shared in terms of establishing rules, monitoring and enforcement. In most jurisdictions the exchange has the primary role for real time surveillance as well as post trade surveillance. The typical exchange shares information on 4 of 9 dimensions (these 9 dimensions are defined in Table 2 ), has 1 surveillance department, and provides a self ranking of 2.15 out of 5 for effectiveness on the different dimensions of surveillance (the effectiveness dimensions are also defined in Table 2 ).
The data were provided on a completely confidential basis and as such, minimum and maximum values are not indicated in Table 3 Panel A for market variables in order to maintain confidentiality. We are nevertheless able to indicate averages, medians and standard deviations. Table 3 Panel A indicates that the average exchange in the data is small relative to the trading activity on the US exchanges, as expected since the data are from a broad array of exchanges from emerging and developed markets from around the world. The average exchange in the data has 567 listed companies, of which 5% are foreign and 2% are cross listed on the US exchanges.
As well, the average [median] number of products traded is 7.36 [8], thereby giving rise to a significant need for cross-product surveillance (e.g., as between derivatives and stocks, etc.). [ Figure 4 About Here] Table 3 Panel B also presents data in regards to information sharing arrangements across jurisdictions, and differences as between exchanges and securities commissions. The data clearly indicate securities commissions are much more likely to have information sharing arrangements than exchanges, and share a greater amount of information. The types of information shared is graphically illustrated in Figure 5 , and there are clear pronounced differences in the willingness of exchanges to coordinate information sharing relative to securities commissions.
[ Figure 5 About Here] Table 4 In addition to providing suggestive relations between variables of interest, the correlations in Table 4 provide guidance as to potential problems for multicollinearity in the multivariate analyses in the next section below. Further to the correlation evidence, the multivariate analyses below sort out issues of causality between surveillance activity and trading, among other things.
Multivariate Analyses
Our multivariate analyses are separated into two parts. The first part, reported in subsection 4.1, considers the scope of surveillance activity. Thereafter subsection 4.2 considers the effectiveness of such market surveillance.
The Scope of Market Surveillance
Section 3 presented graphs and univariate correlations indicating a relationship between cross-market surveillance and trading activity, along with other variables in the data. The correlation evidence is suggestive, but does not get at the question of whether surveillance is caused by, and/or causes, trading activity. That is, an increase in surveillance should enhance market confidence and market participation thereby enhancing trading activity. Similarly, markets with greater trading activity have greater revenues from which to invest in surveillance.
In order to address this issue of simultaneous causality between surveillance and trading, we employ three-stage least squares methods whereby trading and single-and cross-market surveillance are simultaneously explained. We focus our discussion on Model (1) in Table 5 which comprises the following set of three simultaneous equations:
(1) Scope of Single-market Surveillance = f (the degree to which the exchange versus the securities commission is involved in post trade surveillance, the number of trades)
(2) Scope of Cross-market Surveillance = f (the degree to which the exchange versus the securities commission is involved in post trade surveillance, the extent of information sharing in neighbour jurisdictions, the number of trades, the number of products traded, the proportion of US cross-listings) (3) Number of Trades = f (the scope of single-market surveillance, the scope of cross-market surveillance, civil law dummy variable, GDP per capita, and the proportion of US cross listings)
In this system of three equations, the scope of single-market surveillance, cross-market surveillance and the number of trades are considered endogenous variables. The other variables are considered exogenous. We also use as instruments the number of departments involved in surveillance and the degree to which the exchange versus the securities commission is involved in setting trading rules. Below, we briefly explain the rationale underlying this specification. Note as well that other specifications were considered and are quite robust to alternative specifications (available upon request).
The degree to which the exchange versus the securities commission is involved in surveillance is likely to have a significant influence on the scope of surveillance in equations (1) and (2) for two possible alternative reasons. On one hand, the exchange has a self-interested financial role in providing the highest integrity market to enhance trading activity and revenues, suggesting there should be a positive relation between the role of the exchange and surveillance.
On the other hand, public enforcement may be associated with greater surveillance insofar as public regulators have more severe enforcement powers, and can secure more information from market participants through legal proceedings, etc.
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The extent to which trading activity takes place in a market is likely a predictor of both single-and cross-market surveillance. Jurisdictions with more intensive trading have greater revenues and therefore greater financial ability to put in place more sophisticated technology and better trained staff to be engaged in surveillance. While there are other proxies that are highly correlated with trading volume, such as GDP per capita, market capitalization, etc., we do not simultaneously include these control variables in order to avoid collinearity problems. find evidence in support of the view that private enforcement benefits markets, but not public enforcement, which is consistent with our results presented below.
In equation (2) for cross-market surveillance we also include a variable for the extent of information sharing across jurisdictions. To a certain degree this variable will be exogenous in that information sharing is due to the neighbouring jurisdiction's predisposition to engage in information sharing. Information sharing, however, is endogenous to cross-border surveillance insofar as only jurisdictions with cross-border listed securities will have a more direct incentive to share information. The specification reported below does not control for this endogeneity issue for three reasons. First, our definition of 'cross-market' concerns anything from cross-product to cross-border trading, and not just cross-border activities. Second, even where exchanges do not have cross-border listed securities, traders may nevertheless engage in trades across jurisdictions, which renders all exchanges subject to facing a need to share information regardless of the extent of cross-listed and/or foreign securities. Third, even when we did consider instruments to control for potential endogeneity of information sharing vis-à-vis cross-market surveillance (such as location variables), the results did not vary in a statistically significant way; therefore, we report the results without the instruments for this variable.
There is arguably less of a concern with regard to the endogeneity of the variables for the number of products and the proportion of US cross-listed securities in equation (2). Introducing a new product gives rise to (causes) more surveillance, and not vice versa. Cross listing in the US is the decision of the listed company, not the exchange. As such, we treat these explanatory variables as exogenous in the system.
The dependent variable in equation (3) is the number of trades. The right-hand-side variables include controls for civil versus common law and GDP per capita, which is consistent with La Porta et al. (1997, 1998, 2006) . Equation (3) also controls for the proportion of US cross-listings, which is considered to be exogenous as in equation (2). Both the single-and crossmarket surveillance activity in the system of equations is considered endogenous. Table 5 presents three alternative Models. Model (1) uses trading activity. Models (2) and (3) in Table 5 are very similar, with the exception that Model (2) uses the number of listed companies instead of the number of trades and Model (3) uses market capitalization instead of the number of listed companies. These variables are positively correlated with one another, and as such they are not considered in the same model. The objective in Models (2) and (3) is similar to performance.
[ Table 5 About Here]
The evidence in Table 5 indicates a strong positive association between the role of an exchange in post-trade surveillance and the scope of single-market surveillance. The economic significance is such that a 20% increase in the role of the exchange versus the securities commission (an increase in the ranking by 1 point out of 5) is associated with surveillance of 3 additional types of single-market manipulations, and this effect is significant at the 1% level of significance. Trading activity, however, is statistically unrelated to single-market surveillance in Table 5 , consistent with the graphical depiction of the data in Figure 2 .
While trading activity and single-market surveillance are statistically uncorrelated, trading activity is strongly positively associated with the scope of cross-market surveillance in a statistically significant way in Table 5 . An increase in trading activity by 100 million trades is associated with an increase in the scope of surveillance by 4 types of cross-market surveillance, and this effect is significant at the 1% level. The scope of cross-market surveillance is also affected by the extra of US cross-listings: a 2% increase in US cross-listings is associated with a greater scope in cross-market surveillance by 1 type of market manipulation (and this effect is likewise significant at the 1% level).
Model (1) in Table 5 further indicates trading activity is enhanced by the extent of crossmarket surveillance (although not single-market surveillance). An increase in the scope of surveillance by 1 extra type of manipulation is associated with 25 million extra trades per year.
The economic significance of this effect is quite large, and as such, we considered the role of influential observations and outliers in driving this result. Cook's distances and leverage plots consistently pointed to one influential observation, and this observation is graphically apparent in Figure 2 : the observation from the exchange with the greatest number of trades. We re-ran the regressions in Table 5 without that one influential observation and found the economic significance reduced by approximately half (and the effect remained statistically significant at the 1% level); in particular, an increase the scope of cross-market surveillance by 1 type of manipulation is associated with 10 million extra trades per year.
As a further alternative specification (not explicitly reported but available upon request), we used a variable for the number of trades per listed company, and the effect continued to remain significant at the 1% level. The economic significance was such that an increase in scope of cross-market surveillance facilitates an extra 9,800 trades per listed company in equation (3).
Conversely, in equation (2) the effect of the number of trades per listed company on the scope of cross-market surveillance remained significant at the 1% level, whereby an extra 100,000 trades per company is associated with an extra 8 types of cross-market manipulations investigated.
Other variables in Model (1) equation (3) explaining trading activity are less significant than and/or not as robust as the cross-market surveillance variable. For instance, despite the strong correlation of 0.31 between GDP per capita and the number of trades in Table 4 (which is significant at the 10% level of significance), the multivariate evidence in Table 5 does not support a significant relation between GDP per capita and the number of trades in Model 1. Table 5 also indicates exchanges with a greater proportion of US cross-listings have fewer trades. We note,
however, that that effect is not robust and is highly influenced by the inclusion/exclusion of the other variables. However, when we exclude the variable for the proportion of the US crosslistings in Model (1) for equation (3), the other variables are not affected in any statistically significant way.
In sum, Model (1) in Table (5) indicates a strong relation between cross-market surveillance and trading activity, and this relation is stronger and more robust than any other variable considered. As the statistical relation between cross-market surveillance and trading activity is central new finding in this paper, it is worth stressing the nature of this relation that is apparent in the data. The data are cross-country in nature, and do not involve a time series. As such, the data should not be used to infer that an exchange can directly increase its trading activity by increasing the scope of cross-market surveillance. A change in the scope of surveillance without any change in the underlying factors that explain why some countries have extensive cross-market surveillance and others do not may not result in any notable change in trading activity. Rather, the correct interpretation of the statistical relations in Table 5 is as follows: the data indicate that the factors that explain the additional cross-market surveillance in certain jurisdictions also facilitate additional trading in those jurisdictions by enhancing the confidence of market participants. By contrast, as many exchanges with and without high integrity nevertheless purport to have extensive single market surveillance, single market surveillance does not distinguish one exchange from another and is hence unrelated to trading activity.
Models (2) and (3) provide analogous regressions to Model (1), albeit with a few main differences that are worth highlighting in regards to the use of the number of listed companies in Model (2) and market capitalization in Model (3) instead of the number of trades. In Model (2), the scope of cross-market surveillance is associated with a greater number of listed companies.
An increase in cross-market surveillance is by 1 type of manipulation is associated with an increase in the number of companies by 196. As this effect is unrealistically large, we re-ran this regression without the outlier observation (as discussed immediately above), and the economic significance of this effect reduced to 15 newly firms listed associated with an increase in the scope of surveillance by 1 extra type of manipulation. Note as well that there is a negative association between the scope of single-market surveillance and the number of listed companies.
Referring back to Table 4 , we find a positive correlation of 0.51 between cross-market surveillance and the number of listed companies, and a negative correlation of -0.22 between the number of listed companies and single-market surveillance. One explanation for this somewhat puzzling result is that companies are more inclined to list in lower integrity markets whereby company insiders can trade in ways that are personally beneficial and not subject to detection by surveillance. This effect may also be different for different levels of exchange integrity (i.e., a nonlinear relation), but the extent of data do not enable such tests of nonlinearities. Table 5 provides evidence of a positive relation between the scope of crossmarket surveillance and market capitalization. An increase in the scope of cross-market surveillance is associated with an increase in market capitalization by US$ 62 billion. The economic significance of this effect is robust to the inclusion/exclusion of outlier observations.
Model (3) in
As discussed above, this does not necessarily mean that an exchange can increase its market capitalization by increasing cross-market surveillance; rather, it means that in comparing exchanges around the world, the factors that have given rise to additional cross-market surveillance have also facilitated an increase in market capitalization.
Overall, Models (1) -(3) provide strong evidence that exchange quality (number of trades, listed companies and market capitalization) and cross-market surveillance are highly related. Controlling for simultaneous causality to the fullest extent possible, the data are consistent with the view that exchanges can enhance their market integrity by increasing the scope of their cross-market surveillance. The regressions were quite robust (except where otherwise noted), and have fairly high adjusted R 2 values explaining up to 60% of the variation in the dependent variables.
Section 5 below qualitatively discusses limitations and extensions associated with the regression evidence on the scope of surveillance and related issues not addressed by the data. But before proceeding to that discussion, we first address the empirical issue of factors related to international differences in the effectiveness of surveillance in subsection 4.2.
The Effectiveness of Market Surveillance
In this subsection we provide OLS and ordered logit estimates of the effectiveness of market surveillance. The dependent variables in this section are the qualitative rankings on the 1 (low effectiveness) -5 (high effectiveness) scale. 12 These data to some degree are of course subject to a self-reporting bias, but nevertheless provide guidance as to the factors that affect the self-satisfaction of surveillance authorities with the quality of the work they carry out. We present 7 models (labeled Models 4 -10 in Table 6 ) with different specifications of the dependent and explanatory variables.
[ Table 6 About Here] Models (4) -(6) use the average ranking variable for all elements of effectiveness defined in Table 2 , In Models (7) -(10) the dependent variable is defined differently. Model (7) uses the ranking for real time surveillance, while Models (8), (9) and (10) use the rankings for cross-product, cross-market and cross-border surveillance, respectively. Models (7) - (10) use ordered logit models, not OLS, as the dependent variable is an ordinal ranking variable that takes on a finite number of discrete variables. Models (4) -(6) use an average ranking and hence can assume a continuous range of values such that OLS was used. Tobit regressions were also estimated for Models (4) -(6) (since the dependent variable is bounded), but since the regression results were not materially different we only present the OLS estimates (Tobit estimates are available upon request).
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Figure 4 provided companion evidence on effectiveness of surveillance; however, as discussed above in section 3, that data was limited in that only 11 jurisdictions provided data used in Figure 4 and therefore those data are not used in the regression analyses in this subsection. Model (6) also indicates a positive association between information sharing arrangements and effectiveness; however, that effect is not robust to the specifications in Models (4) and (5).
Model (3) further indicates a positive association between effectiveness and the average value of trades and the number of products traded on the exchange. One possible explanation for these latter results is that those exchanges have greater operating budgets for surveillance technology and staff.
Consistent with Models (4) -(6), Model (7) indicates a positive association between the role of the exchange versus the securities commission and the effectiveness of real time surveillance. However, note that the role of the exchange is not associated with effectiveness for cross-product, cross-market or cross-border surveillance. Effectiveness of cross-market and cross-border surveillance is positively associated with the scope of information sharing arrangements, and that effect is significant at the 10% level in Model (9) for cross-market and at the 1% level for cross-border in Model (10). Recall as well from Table 3 Panel B and Figure 5 that securities commissions are more likely than exchanges to engage in information sharing arrangements and share a greater scope of information pertaining to surveillance.
In sum, the data introduced in this paper present a picture whereby jurisdictions are more satisfied with domestic single-market surveillance where the exchange plays a primary role in the surveillance. Exchanges, however, are less adept than securities commissions at establishing information sharing arrangements. Likewise, jurisdictions with exchanges playing a primary role in surveillance over securities commissions are likewise less satisfied with the effectiveness of their cross-market surveillance than their single-market surveillance. Therefore, there appears to be ample scope for exchanges to expand their information sharing arrangements; this in turn would thereby facilitate trading volume.
Limitations and Extensions
This paper presented a first-ever direct comparison of exchange surveillance across financial markets around the world. The data are nevertheless limited in scope. In this study we were able to obtain confidential private data from 25 jurisdictions from North, Central and South America, Western and Eastern Europe, Africa and Asia. Our empirical analyses presented a variety of robustness checks and controls for potential endogeneity and collinearity, among other things. Additional robustness checks were discussed and are available upon request. For instance, we considered dropping certain exchanges from the data as potential outliers. Any single exchange in the data did not materially influence the statistical significance of the results, although we did discuss cases in which economic significance was affected by the exclusion of the largest exchange in the data. As well, excluding groups of exchanges at the same time was not possible with the limited degrees of freedom.
In subsection 4b we considered the possibility of self reporting biases in regards to the respondent's perceptions of their own surveillance effectiveness. That type of self-reported information is nevertheless informative as it enables a qualitative assessment of where exchanges are at in terms of their own self satisfaction, and what drives differences in the level of satisfaction across exchanges. All of the exchanges were informed about, and assured of the confidentiality of their data, which we believe minimizes self-reporting biases.
Ideally, one would like to expand the number of jurisdictions, but at this stage our data comprise all exchanges that were willing to participate given the extent and sensitivity of information that was sought. Future research could also examine cross-market surveillance in relation to changes in mergers of exchanges such as the June 2006 merger between NYSE and Euronext, as well as cross-ownership of exchanges such as NASDAQ's interest in the London Stock Exchange.
Conclusions
Market manipulation refers to a wide range of trading practices that distort prices and inhibit market integrity and efficiency, and the detection of such practices is carried out by market surveillance. This paper presented a first-ever direct comparison of the scope of single-and cross-market surveillance around the world. The data examined also enabled consideration of the effectiveness of single-and cross-market surveillance.
The new data introduced in this paper indicated a number of new insights about international differences in market surveillance in relation to market quality and integrity. On one hand, the data showed that jurisdictions with exchanges as SROs are more intensive in regards to single-market surveillance than securities commissions. On the other hand, SRO exchanges do not play a greater role in cross-market surveillance. Cross-market surveillance is more effective with information sharing arrangements, and securities commissions are more likely to engage in information sharing than exchanges.
The empirical analyses in this paper showed that single-market surveillance is uncorrelated with trading activity, while cross-market surveillance is highly positively correlated with trading activity. This evidence was robust in terms of simple univariate evidence as well as This table summarizes primary different types of market manipulation that is considered by market surveillance authorities (stock exchanges in the case of SROs or securities commissions / regulatory authorities for other exchanges) for both single and cross-market surveillance.
For Equities and Other Securities
Spoofing/Painting the tape Engaging in a series of transactions reported on a public display facility to give the impression of activity or price movement in a security (e.g. misleading trading, switches, giving up priority, layering bid/asks, fictitious orders for the case of spoofing, etc.) Wash sale Improper transaction in which there is no genuine change in actual ownership of the security or derivative contract
Matched orders Transactions where both buy and sell orders are entered at the same time with the same price and quantity by different but colluding parties. Advancing the bid Increasing the bid for a security or derivative to increase its price
Pump & dump/Ramping Buying at increasingly higher prices. Securities are sold in the market (often to retail customers) at the higher prices
Marking the open The placing of purchase orders at slightly higher prices/sale orders at lower prices to drive up/suppress the price of the securities when the market opens Marking the close Buying or selling securities or derivatives contracts at the close of the market in an effort to alter the closing price of the security or derivatives contract
Mini Manipulation Trading in the underlying security of an option in order to manipulate its price so that the options will become in-themoney Parking or warehousing
Hiding the true ownership of securities / underlying by creating a set of fictitious transactions and trades.
Churning Frequent and excessive trading of a clients account
Pre-arranged trade Transactions in which the price, terms or contra-side have been pre-arranged.
Year End /As Of Trades Transactions executed at a particular date to establish gains or losses or conceal portfolio losses or true positions.
Dissemination Dissemination of false or misleading market information
Trade through The completion of a client's order at a price inferior to the best posted bid or ask Front running A transaction to the detriment of the order giver on the basis of and ahead of an order which he is to carry out for another Short Sales A market transaction in which an investor sells stock he does not have or he has borrowed in anticipation of a price decline (which is considered manipulative in some jurisdictions in conjunction with other types of actions; for example, in Canada, under UMIR Rule 6.2(viii)(ix), a short sale cannot be at a price that is less than the last sale price).
Insider trading When a trade has been influenced by the privileged possession of corporate information or price sensitive market order that has not yet been made public
Money laundering
Creating the appearance that money value obtained from serious crimes, such as drug trafficking or terrorist activity, originated from a illegitimate source
Specifically For Derivatives
Option 
Squeeze
Taking advantage of a shortage in an asset by controlling the demand-side and exploiting market congestion during such shortages in a way as to create artificial prices.
Capping [Pegging]
Effecting transactions of instrument underlying an option shortly before the option's expiration date to prevent a rise/decline in price of the instrument so previously written call/ put options will expire worthless, protecting premiums previously received.
Specifically For Commodities Futures

Contract Prices at Different Expirations
The price of the manipulated contract is abnormally high relative to the price of the contracts expiring later (that is, the price of the "front month" contract is artificially high relative to the deferred or "back month" contracts).
Prices of Related Products at Delivery Locations
The expiring futures price and the spot price at the delivery market are abnormally high relative to prices at other, nondeliverable locations; the prices of related products; and prices of non-deliverable grades of the same commodity.
Spot and Futures Prices at Different Delivery Points
The spot price in the delivery market declines both absolutely and relative to deferred month futures prices and spot prices at other locations around the end of futures trading or the delivery period.
Commodity flows to delivery points (1) Large shipments of the commodity flow to the delivery point immediately prior to and during the delivery period. Moreover, shipments from the delivery point are abnormally small during the delivery period as traders amass stocks to make delivery.
Commodity flows to delivery points (2)
Delivery point receipts are abnormally small after the delivery period because of the glut of the commodity at the delivery point that results from the artificially large receipts during the delivery period. Shipments from the delivery point increase after the end of a corner as some of the excess shipments are returned to their original sources and delayed shipments are released.
Table 2. Definitions of Variables
This table defines the variables used in the empirical analyses. Data were provided by 15 stock exchanges, 9 securities commissions and 1 independent market regulator from North, Central and South America, Western and Eastern Europe, Africa and Asia (see Figure 1 ).
Surveillance Variables
Scope of Single-market Surveillance
The sum of dummy variables equal to 1 where surveillance in the jurisdiction involves considering the market matters indicated in Table 1 (e.g., spoofing, painting the tape, wash sales, etc.) for single-market surveillance.
Scope of Cross-market Surveillance
The sum of dummy variables equal to 1 where surveillance in the jurisdiction involves considering the market matters indicated in Table 1 (e.g., spoofing, painting the tape, wash sales, etc.) for cross-market surveillance (including crossproduct, cross-exchange and international).
Exchange vs Commission Surveillance --Establish Rules
The average ranking (5=exchange, 1=securities commission) for establishing listing standards, establishing market trading rules, establishing rules on cross-product trading, establishing rules on cross-market trading, and establishing rules on cross-border trading. Where appropriate, the subcomponent of the ranking is used.
Exchange vs Commission Surveillance --Monitoring
The average ranking (5=exchange, 1=securities commission) for monitoring listing standards, real time surveillance, post trade surveillance, monitoring of rules on cross-product trading, monitoring of rules on cross-market trading, and monitoring of rules on cross-border trading. Where appropriate, the subcomponent of the ranking is used.
Exchange vs Commission Surveillance --Enforcement
The average ranking (5=exchange, 1=securities commission) for enforcing listing standards, enforcement market trading rules, enforcement of rules on cross-product trading, enforcement of rules on cross-market trading, and enforcement of rules on cross-border trading. Where appropriate, the subcomponent of the ranking is used. Number of Surveillance Departments The number of departments deemed to have at least some responsibility for carrying out market surveillance.
Effectiveness of Surveillance
Ranking of ability (1=unable 5=excellent) to carry out surveillance on the following matters: real time surveillance, cross-product trading surveillance, cross-market trading surveillance, cross-border trading surveillance, OTC trading surveillance, ability to replay the market, ability to track changes in price or volume of a particular security or derivatives and underlying, ability to track changes in price or volume of a related scurrility or derivatives and underlying, identify concentration of ownership, provide alerts and information concerning suspicious transactions, provide alerts and information concerning suspicious cross-market transactions, provide alerts and information concerning cross-border transactions, identify potentially large market losses / gains incurred by members or large market participants, ability to share data with other markets, ability to share system with other markets, identify parties to the transaction, provide analysis or relations between parties to the suspicious transactions, ability to analyze/study alerts and reports with other markets.
Information Sharing Arrangements
Sum of dummy variables equal to 1 for types of information contained in information sharing arrangements: (1) identity of the member/intermediary, (2) identity of the dealer, (3) identities of the member/intermediary, (4) trading activity, (5) positions held by the member/intermediary, (6) details of investigation of the member/intermediary, (7) details of investigation of dealers or clients of the member/intermediary, (8) details of disciplinary action against the member/intermediary, (9) details of disciplinary action against the dealers or clients of the member/intermediary.
Specifics in Information Sharing Arrangements
Dummy variables equal to one where the jurisdiction has information sharing arrangements on each of the following categories: real time trading information provided electronically, end of day trading information provided electronically, delayed trading information provided electronically, daily market surveillance reports (electronic), daily market surveillance reports (hard copy), regular market surveillance reports (electronic), regular market surveillance reports (hard copy), market surveillance reports (electronic) upon request, market surveillance reports (hard copy) upon request, obtaining information / documents relating to a product traded through the other organization, obtaining information / documents on current and former intermediaries, obtaining information / documents on current members, obtaining information / documents on former members, obtaining other general information / documents, onsite inspection of books / records, ability to carry out separate yet coordinated investigation, participate in joint investigations, share investigatory information upon request, ability and assistance to proceed with civil enforcement, ability and assistance to proceed with criminal enforcement, assistance in freezing / sequestration of assets, and other. Proportion of US Cross Listings Proportion of companies cross-listed in the US.
Number of Products
The number of products offered by the exchange (including derivatives, bonds, etc.).
Country Variables
Civil Law A dummy variable equal to 1 for civil law jurisdictions and 0 for common law jurisdictions.
GDP / Capita
The GDP per capita in 2005 of the country in which the exchange is based, expressed in 2005 US dollars. 
